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“Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus
dare; to interpret law, and not to make law or give law.”
Francis Bacon, 1626
The purpose of this article is to establish a principled basis for
restraint of judicial lawmaking.  The principle is that all findings of
fact, whether of legislative or adjudicative facts, must be based on
evidence in the record of a case.  This principle is grounded in moral
philosophy.  I will begin with a discussion of the relevant aspect of
moral philosophy, then state and defend the principle, and finally
apply it to a line of cases.
I. MORAL PHILOSOPHY
A profound issue in law and in ethics is whether to judge a case
or an act by considerations a priori or a posteriori.1  Once the choice is
made, a principled way to constrain judicial lawmaking emerges.
* © copyright 2018 Michael Evan Gold, Associate Professor of Labor Relations, Law, and
History, Cornell University.
1. See generally Bruce Russell, A Priori Justification and Knowledge, STANFORD ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 19, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/; Michael
DePaul & Amelia Hicks, A Priorism in Moral Epistemology, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHI-
LOSOPHY (June 28, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/moral-epistemol
ogy-a-priori.
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To judge a posteriori (Latin for “from what comes after”) is to
judge based on the future, in other words, based on consequences.2  In
law, a policy argument is a posteriori: “If the court rules in favor of my
client, children will go to bed on time without protest, and peace will
come to the Middle East; but if the court rules against my client, birds
will no longer sing, and husbands and wives will argue endlessly.”  In
ethics, a utilitarian argument is a posteriori: “Given the choice be-
tween drinking champagne or contributing to the home for retired
professors, the latter is the moral choice because it will produce more
happiness for more persons.”
To judge a priori (Latin for “from what comes before”) is to
judge based on the past, in other words, rules or standards.3  In law, an
argument based on precedent is a priori: “Up v. Down is analogous to
Back v. Forth and therefore should have the same outcome.”  A con-
tract is a priori: “The creditor was entitled to assess a late fee because
the contract requires payment by the twenty-fifth of each month and
adds a fee of thirty-nine dollars for a late payment, and the debtor’s
check reached the creditor on the twenty-sixth.”  In ethics, a deonto-
logical argument is a priori: “One has a duty to show respect to one’s
teachers.”
Arguments a priori and a posteriori are equally legitimate, and I
know of no generally accepted method of choosing between them
when such arguments point in opposite directions in a case.  In this
essay, I will propose a method to make such a choice.
Before explaining this method, however, I must consider two
common ways of choosing between arguments, whether they be of the
same type (e.g. a priori versus a priori) or of different types (a priori
versus a posteriori).  One common way of choosing between argu-
ments is to identify a flaw in one of the arguments: “Left v. Right is
not a precedent for the case at bar because the cases are distinguisha-
ble in that . . .” or “The rule advocated by the plaintiff will not lead to
. . ., but will lead instead to . . . .”  This method of choosing between
arguments is legitimate (though I will have a few words to say below
on predictions).  A flawed argument is no basis for decision.
A second common way of choosing between competing argu-
ments occurs when the arguments are not flawed.  Indeed, they are
forcible and, upon reading them, for example, in majority and dissent-
2. Russell, supra note 1.
3. Id.
482 [VOL. 62:481
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ing opinions, a reasonable, informed, and disinterested person says to
oneself, “I don’t know why the judges voted as they did.”  Typically,
the judges write (if they write anything at all on the choice), “Argu-
ment A outweighs argument B” or “A is stronger than B” or “A is
more convincing than B.”  Of course, this is not an explanation, but a
choice without a justification.  The choice may be based on a reason
present in the judge’s mind, but the judge prefers not to express it.
The choice may be based on a reason inchoate in the judge’s mind,
though not formed sufficiently for the judge to articulate.  The choice
may be based on no reason at all other than a feeling.  Whatever the
reason, a choice based on it is not exposed to the adversarial process
and, as a result, is subject to error, bias, and caprice, and has no place
in reasoned discourse.  If a judge is confronted with competing, un-
flawed arguments and cannot, or will not, articulate a reasoned basis
for choosing between them, the judge should recuse oneself from the
case.  If all judges of a court recuse themselves, resolution of the issue
may better be left to another court or agency of government.
Now suppose that an argument a priori and an argument a poster-
iori stand in competition, and neither is flawed.  Must an honest judge
recuse oneself from the decision?  The answer is no.  A principled
method exists for choosing between such arguments.
As I stated at the outset of this essay, the struggle between argu-
ments a priori and arguments a posteriori is profound.  It is also long-
standing, and it is enshrined in competing schools of thought.  Conse-
quentialists hold that decisions should be grounded on a posteriori
facts, that is, consequences of actions.4  Deontologists (New Latin for
“those who study duty”) hold that decisions should be grounded on a
priori principles, that is, duties or norms.5  Not surprisingly, hybrid or
mixed schools exist, which I will call “non-consequentialism.”  Non-
consequentialists hold that decisions may be grounded on conse-
quences, on duties, or on both.6  I intend to show that, correctly un-
derstood, the differences among these schools disappear.
4. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 17, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/
(“Consequentialists hold that choices—acts and/or intentions—are to be morally assessed solely
by the states of affairs they bring about.” § 1, Deontology’s Foil: Consequentialism); see also
Michael Slote, Satisficing Consequentialism, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY,
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 140–142 (Blackwell Publishing 1984).
5. Alexander & Moore, supra note 4 (“For such deontologists, what makes a choice right is
its conformity with a moral norm.” § 2, Deontological Theories.”).
6. Id.
2019] 483
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Nonetheless, conflict between arguments a priori and a posteriori will
continue to occur.  I will show that, based on a correct understanding,
a method exists to weigh deontological and consequential arguments
against one another.
Every moral theory has two elements: a theory of the good and a
theory of right action that leads to the good.7  For a utilitarian, the
good is happiness and right action maximizes happiness.8  (“Utility” is
a synonym for “happiness.”)  Thus, utilitarianism is a consequentialist
theory: an act is right or wrong depending on whether it has the conse-
quence of maximizing happiness.  I am agnostic on utilitarianism’s
theory of the good, but I embrace consequentialism because of three
insights in John Stuart Mill’s essay Utilitarianism.
A.
The first insight is that, however vigorously a deontologist may
eschew arguments a posteriori, in the end, the only reason a deontolo-
gist can provide for a moral law is consequential:
Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the
influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even pre-
dominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however
unwilling to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality
and the source of moral obligation.  I might go much further, and
say, that, to all those a` priori moralists who deem it necessary to
argue at all, utilitarian arguments are indispensable.  It is not my
present purpose to criticize these thinkers; but I cannot help refer-
ring, for illustration, to a systematic treatise by one of the most illus-
trious of them—the “Metaphysics of Ethics,” by Kant.  This
remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of
the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in
the treatise in question, lay down an universal first principle as the
origin and ground of moral obligation.  It is this: “So act, that the
rule [or maxim] on which thou actest would admit of being adopted
as law by all rational beings.”  But, when he begins to deduce from
this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost
7. See, e.g., David Lyons, Utilitarianism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1261, 1262 (Law-
rence Becker & Charlotte Becker eds., 1992) (“A utilitarian theory may be seen as combining
(1) a conception of ‘intrinsic’ value, or fundamental good, which says how consequences are
basically to be appraised, with (2) a view about the relation between ‘rightness’ and ‘goodness,’
i.e., between morally required or defensible conduct and the intrinsic value that can be real-
ized”); STEVEN CAHN & ANDREW FORCEHIMES, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 4, 6 (2017).
8. See Julia Driver, The History of Utilitarianism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY (Sept. 22, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/.
484 [VOL. 62:481
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grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any log-
ical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all ra-
tional beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct.
All he shows is, that the consequences of their universal adoption
would be such as no one would choose to incur.9
Mill does not accomplish what he essays.  His rendition of “Kant’s
‘universal first principle’” is accurate enough.  (Kant himself calls it
the “categorical imperative,” and renders it, “Act only in accordance
with that maxim which you at the same time can will that it become a
universal law.”10)  Then Mill asserts that utilitarian arguments are in-
dispensable to the theories of a priori moralists, a group that includes
Kant.11  This assertion is ambiguous.  It could mean that utilitarian
arguments are indispensable to establishing that the categorical im-
perative is the universal first principle.  Alternatively, the assertion
could mean that a duty that can be deduced from the categorical im-
perative cannot be justified on the ground that the opposite of that
duty would be physically or logically impossible, but can be justified
only on the ground that the opposite duty would have intolerable con-
sequences.  Regrettably, Mill disappoints us with whichever interpre-
tation we choose, for he offers neither evidence nor argument to
support the assertion.  Yet support for one or the other of these inter-
pretations seems essential to the viability of consequentialism.  I shall
not attempt to support the first interpretation (that consequential ar-
guments are indispensable to establishing the categorical imperative).
I think that this meaning is the less plausible interpretation of Mill’s
assertion, and, even if Mill intended this meaning, I doubt that it is
true because I suspect that the categorical imperative rests on intui-
tion.  Instead, I will stand on a proposition, the truth of which Mill
evidently thinks, and I agree, is self-evident: Kant’s attempt to defend
a system of ethics based solely on reasons a priori would be signifi-
cantly weakened by the second interpretation (that Kant’s own appli-
cations of the categorical imperative are justifiable only by their
consequences).  My goal will be to prove that Kantian duties are justi-
fiable only by reasons a posteriori.
9. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 8–9 (The Floating Press 2009) (1879) [hereinafter
UTILITARIANISM].
10. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 119 (Allen W.
Wood ed., 2002)(1797) (emphasis deleted) [hereinafter METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS].
11. UTILITARIANISM, supra note 9, at 9.
2019] 485
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In the treatise which Mill mentions (the title of which has been
variously translated12), Kant applies the categorical imperative to four
cases.  Suicide is the first:
1.  A man, while reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes and
feeling wearied of life, is still so far in possession of his reason that
he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to
himself to take his own life.  Now he inquires whether the maxim of
his action could become a general law of nature.  His maxim is: Out
of self-love I consider it a principle to shorten my life when continu-
ing it is likely to bring more misfortune than satisfaction.  The ques-
tion then simply is whether this principle of self-love could become
a general law of nature.  Now we see at once that a system of na-
ture, whose law would be to destroy life by the very feeling designed
to compel the maintenance of life, would contradict itself, and
therefore could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim
cannot possibly be a general law of nature and consequently it
would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all
duty.13
Mill claims correctly that Kant fails to show a physical or logical im-
possibility.  Obviously, suicide is not physically impossible.  Is it a logi-
cal contradiction?  One may doubt that suicide is based on “self-love”;
perhaps self-loathing and despair are better candidates.  One may also
doubt that self-love is “designed to compel the maintenance of life.”
The obvious response to this teleological, indeed, religious argument
in disguise, is to ask, by whom or what was self-love designed, and
how do we know that it was designed for this purpose?  A Kantian
today might improve the argument by casting it in evolutionary terms:
humans have evolved self-love, and it promotes life.  But even ac-
cepting that suicide is based on self-love and that self-love promotes
life, I find no contradiction in believing that we have no duty to ex-
press an evolved trait.  Humans have evolved to take revenge on those
who injure us, but we have no duty to act on this instinct.  Nor do I
find a contradiction in believing that self-love promotes life only so
long as life is valuable.  Would self-love prohibit suicide if one were
suffering from a terminal and painful illness, or if the sacrifice of one’s
life would save the lives of several others?  Mill also claims that Kant
shows only that the consequences of what he condemns would be un-
12. See, e.g., METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10; IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMEN-
TAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, trans., Global
Grey 2018) (1785) [hereinafter METAPHYSICS OF MORALS].
13. METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 170–71.
486 [VOL. 62:481
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acceptable, and again Mill is correct.14  Kant’s conclusion about sui-
cide—but not his reasoning—is right because a duty or “principle to
shorten [one’s] life” when one is in despair would have intolerable
consequences.15
I will discuss Kant’s second application of the categorical impera-
tive below.  His third application is developing one’s talents:
3.  A third man finds in himself a talent which with the help of some
education might make him a useful man in many respects.  But he
finds himself in comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge in
pleasure rather than to take pains in developing and improving his
fortunate natural capacities.  He asks, however, whether his maxim
of neglecting his natural gifts . . . agrees also with what is called
duty.  He sees that nature could indeed subsist according to such a
general law, though men (like the South Sea Islanders) let their tal-
ents rust and devote their lives merely to . . . enjoyment.  Be he
cannot possibly will that this should be a general law or nature. . . .
For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be de-
veloped, since they have been given to serve him for all sorts of
possible purposes.16
Let us ignore the unsavory implication that South Sea Islanders, and
others who do not develop their talents, are not rational beings, and
instead focus on Kant’s reason that duty requires us to develop our
faculties.  The reason is that a rational being “necessarily wills that his
faculties be developed, since they have been given to serve him for all
sorts of possible purposes.”17  This argument, like the one about sui-
cide, is teleological, if not religious, and my response to its modern-
ized form is similar: that a trait has evolved does not entail that it be
expressed.  In addition, I see no reason why a rational being could not
live by the maxim, “I will pursue my pleasure as long as I do not inter-
fere with another’s doing the same.”  On this maxim, one has no duty
to develop one’s talents.  Kant is right that developing one’s talents is
desirable, not because one cannot rationally fail to do it, but because
the consequences of developing one’s talents are usually better for
oneself and others.
Charity is another application of the categorical imperative:
4.  A fourth, prosperous man, while seeing others whom he could
help having to struggle with great hardship thinks: What concern is
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 171–72.
17. Id.
2019] 487
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it of mine?  Let everyone be as happy as heaven pleases or as he can
make himself.  I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, but
I do not wish either to contribute anything to his welfare or assist
him in his distress.  There is no doubt that if such a way of thinking
were a general law, society might get along very well . . . .  But
although it is possible that a general law of nature might exist in
terms of that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle
should have the general validity of a law of nature.  For a will which
resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many a time one
would need the love and sympathy of others and by such a law of
nature, sprung from one’s own will, one would deprive himself of all
hope of the aid he desires.18
Kant acknowledges that Ayn Rand’s world is not a physical impossi-
bility, but argues that one could not logically will it to exist because
“many a time one would need the love and sympathy of others and . . .
one would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.”19  This
argument is superior to the ones about suicide and developing talents
because this one does not assume the existence of a grand design or
designer.  Nonetheless, the argument depends on another assumption:
everyone needs love and sympathy.  Although this assumption is ques-
tionable—surely some persons never need charity—I will accept it
arguendo.
The question becomes, could a rational being live by the maxim,
“I will take nothing from him . . . [and] I do not wish either to contrib-
ute anything to his welfare or assist him in his distress”20  Kant con-
cedes that “it is possible that a general law of nature might exist in
terms of that maxim.”21  However, he adds, “[I]t is impossible to will
that such a principle should have the general validity of a law of na-
ture.”22  I suspect that many persons would indeed will such a law in
exchange for freedom from incessant requests for charity.  Kant must
mean that one cannot with logical consistency desire such a law to
exist.  Why not?  Because, he says, we all need help, and one who
needs help also wants it.23  I disagree.  Quite a few independent souls
reject charity however desperate their need.  The youth says, “I want
to do it myself.”  The adult says, “I did it my way.”  The force of the
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example of charity springs from a belief, which most of us hold, that
the world is better with charity than without it.  This argument is
plainly consequential.
Let us turn now to the best of Kant’s applications of the categori-
cal imperative, namely, the false promise:
2.  Another man finds himself forced by dire need to borrow money.
He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but he also sees that
nothing will be lent him unless he promises firmly to repay it within
a definite time. . . . [T]he maxim of his action would then be ex-
pressed thus: When I consider myself in want of money, I shall bor-
row money and promise to repay it although I know that I never
can. . . . I then realize at once that [such a maxim] could never hold
as a general law of nature but would necessarily contradict itself.
For if it were a general law that anyone considering himself to be in
difficulties would be able to promise whatever he pleases intending
not to keep his promise, the promise itself and its object would be-
come impossible since no one would believe that anything was
promised him but would ridicule all such statements as vain
pretenses.24
Kant is correct that a false promise would tend to undermine, and in
this sense would contradict, the system of reliance on promises.  Ac-
cordingly, this is Kant’s most successful example.  Nonetheless, it fails
for the same reason that the example of charity fails.
A world without promises could exist.  As Kant certainly knew,
promises meant little in the world of the Iliad and the Odyssey;25 also,
I know of functioning societies today which may value truth less than
our society does (and in recent months I have begun to doubt how
much we value truth).26  Therefore, Kant does not mean that a world
without the system of reliance on promises could not exist.  Rather, he
means that a rational being could not want such a world to exist.
Therefore, the contradiction of the false promise matters to us only
24. Id. at 171.
25. Perhaps the best example is Odysseus, who deceived Clytemnestra by telling her that
Iphigenia would be married to Achilles, conceived the idea of the Trojan Horse, and tricked his
way out of the grasp of the cyclops Polyphemus. See generally HOMER, THE ODYSSEY VIII, IX
(Samuel Butler, trans.) (700 B.C.); VIRGIL, AENEID (John Dryden, trans.) (19 B.C.) (The story
of the Trojan Horse is told in book VIII of the Odyssey and in book II of the Aeneid. The tale of
the escape from the cyclops Polyphemus appears in book IX of the Odyssey.). See also EURIPI-
DES, IPHIGENIA AT AULIS (410 B.C.) (wherein the deceit of Clytemnestra is dramatized).
26. WARREN L. D’AZEVEDO & MICHAEL EVAN GOLD, SOME TERMS FROM LIBERIAN
SPEECH L-3 (1979) (In the speech of the majority of the population, the word “lie” can mean
either a mistake or an intentional falsehood. If the distinction between mistakes and prevarica-
tions does not matter, the intent to tell the truth is somewhat less important to Liberians than to
Americans.).
2019] 489
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because we value the system of reliance on promises.  He is right: our
world is better with such a system than without it.  But this is a conse-
quential argument.
Kant provides another version of the categorical imperative: “Act
so as to treat man, in your own person as well as in that of anyone
else, always as an end, never merely as a means.”27  The word
“merely” is important.  We all use other persons as means to our ends.
For example, when an employer pays a worker to perform a job, the
employer uses the worker as a means to get tasks performed, and the
worker uses the employer as a means to get money.  But if both par-
ties enter into the relationship freely and treat one another respect-
fully (the employer pays a living wage and provides decent working
conditions; the worker returns a day’s work for a day’s pay), each also
treats the other as an end by facilitating the fulfillment of the other’s
end.
However appealing this version of the categorical imperative may
be, it does not dispose of Kant’s four examples.  Consider suicide.  If I
kill myself to stop my suffering, one could say that I am using myself
as a means to an end.  Yet if I exercise in order to strengthen my
heart, am I not also using myself as a means to the end of living
longer?  In both cases, the end is mine: I am using myself to achieve
my own end. A fortiori, I am not using myself merely as a means; I am
also fulfilling my ends.
The same reasoning applies to failing to develop my talents.  Per-
haps in some vague way I am using myself via inaction to achieve the
end of enjoying leisure, but the end of leisure is mine.  As for failing to
give charity, I cannot see how hoarding my sympathy and my money is
using another person as a means in any way.  But if it is, the end is my
own.
Once again, the false promise is Kant’s best example.  A lender
would not lend money to a borrower who the lender knew would not
pay the debt.  Therefore, the borrower’s deceit disrespects the lender’s
dignity by compromising the lender’s autonomy.  Autonomy has been
valuable since the rise of individualism in the West in the last few
centuries, but in earlier centuries, a person’s identity rested on the
groups to which one belonged (e.g., Greek or Roman, pagan or Chris-
tian, noble or commoner) and individual autonomy was not a para-
27. METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 178 (emphasis deleted).
490 [VOL. 62:481
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mount value.28  This statement is true even today among many non-
Western peoples, among whom one’s tribe or religion is far more im-
portant than one’s autonomy.  A Kantian might reply that, even if au-
tonomy is not valuable a priori, it remains true that everyone wishes
to be treated with respect.  Thus, the question becomes, is a false
promise disrespectful a priori?  The answer is no.  The harm of a false
promise depends on context and consequences.  In a community that
values social connections and mutual welfare, autonomy is unimpor-
tant, and a false promise is not disrespectful.  In such a community, if
the borrower puts the money to good use, perhaps even repays it with
generous interest (though repayment was not foreseeable at the time
of the loan)—in other words, if the consequences of the loan are
good—the lender will be satisfied.  A modern Westerner might also be
satisfied on these facts.
That Kant ultimately relies on consequences is apparent from his
response to the case of lying to a miscreant.  Suppose an armed man
asks you menacingly, “Where is your friend?”  Kant says that you
should tell the truth because if you lie, but your friend has moved
from the place where you think he is to the place where you say he is,
you would be responsible for his death.29  Thus, Kant believes that
you would be responsible for lying because the consequence might be
bad.  Should you not also be responsible for telling the truth because
the consequence might be good?
I have argued that Mill is correct regarding Kant’s examples of a
priori duties—they are, upon analysis, grounded on their conse-
quences—thereby weakening Kant’s theory considerably.  If Kant
can’t illustrate it, who can?  Consequentialism, therefore, is the more
plausible method of justifying moral claims.
B.
Now I will turn to the second insight in Utilitarianism that makes
me a consequentialist.  Mill says that when duties conflict, the choice
between them rests on consequences.  He may be mistaken in the case
in which a higher-order duty takes precedence over a lower-order
duty (for example, a constitution takes precedence over a statute, re-
28. John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 9, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/.
29. See generally James Edwin Mahon, The Truth About Kant on Lies, in THE PHILOSOPHY
OF DECEPTION 211–224 (Clancy W. Martin ed. 2009), https://philpapers.org/archive/MAHTTA
.pdf.
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gardless of consequences), but he is right in the far more common case
in which duties of equal rank (or duties the relative rank of which is
indeterminate) point in opposite directions.  Mill writes:
There exists no moral system under which there do not arise une-
quivocal cases of conflicting obligation . . . . If utility is the ultimate
source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide be-
tween them when their demands are incompatible.  Though the ap-
plication of the standard may be difficult, it is better than none at
all: while in other systems, the moral laws all claiming independent
authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between
them; their claims to precedence one over another rest on little bet-
ter than sophistry; and unless determined, as they generally are, by
the unacknowledged influence of considerations of utility, afford a
free scope for the action of personal desires and partialities.30
Once again focusing on the consequentialism of Mill’s argument,
while remaining agnostic on happiness as the ultimate good, I believe
that Mill is correct.  Kant does not admit that duties can conflict, and
it may seem plausible that maxims by which all rational beings can live
would be consistent with one another.  Yet duties derived from the
categorical imperative do conflict.  Consider suicide.  I must not com-
mit suicide because it would be motivated by self-love, a principle that
promotes life.  At the same time, I must honor the duty of charity by
providing for my dependents after my death.  Surely, I would violate
that duty by allowing a lengthy incurable disease to consume the as-
sets that I have saved for the benefit of my family.  The way to resolve
this and other conflicts of duty is to weigh the good against the bad
that observance of the conflicting duties would cause.
C.
The third insight in Utilitarianism that makes me a consequential-
ist is Mill’s response to the venerable criticism of consequentialism
that a moral agent cannot weigh the consequences of every decision.31
An agent has neither the time nor the information, and perhaps not
the capacity, to perform the appropriate calculations.32  I will deepen
this criticism by noting that weighing the consequences of a decision
requires predictions about the future, and predictions are problem-
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atic.33  For easy decisions, we may be certain of our predictions.  If A
punches B in the nose, we can be sure that B will not like it.  But for
difficult decisions, especially decisions regarding social policy, predic-
tions are uncertain.  If I keep my reservations for a long-planned trip
to Europe and miss my sister’s recently announced wedding, will she
understand or bear a grudge, and will Mother take Sister’s side or
mine?  If the tax on gasoline, which is generating decreasing revenue
due to more fuel-efficient cars, is replaced with a tax on miles driven,
will the public’s incentive to purchase efficient vehicles be dimin-
ished?  Decisions should not be based on uncertain predictions, which
are open to error and to influence by interest, bias, unexamined as-
sumptions, and so forth.
Although Mill seems to have in mind only the first of these criti-
cisms, what he says defeats them both.
The answer to the objection is, that there has been ample time;
namely, the whole past duration of the human species.  During all
that time, mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies
of actions, on which experience all the prudence as well as all the
morality of life are dependent.  People talk as if the commencement
of this course of experience had hitherto been put off, and as if, at
the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the
property or life of another, he had to begin considering for the first
time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happi-
ness. . . . It is truly a whimsical supposition, that [mankind] would
remain without any agreement as to what is useful, and would take
no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the
young, and enforced by law and opinion . . . . [M]ankind must by
this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some
actions on their happiness; and the beliefs which have thus come
down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philos-
opher, until he has succeeded in finding better. . . .Whatever we
adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require
subordinate principles to apply it by: the impossibility of doing with-
out them, being common to all systems, can afford no argument
against any one in particular. . . .34
A consequentialist cannot puzzle over the effects of every decision.
Instead, one may rely on “subordinate principles” or the “rules of mo-
rality,” which are the product of “experience [as to] the tendencies of
33. Aaron Lester, The Problem with Predictions, HARV. GAZETTE (Apr. 25, 2013), https://
news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2013/04/the-problem-with-predictions/.
34. UTILITARIANISM, supra note 9, at 42–44.
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actions” to promote the good.35  And one who relies on principles
need not make troublesome predictions, for principles grow out of
past experience.
May a consequentialist deviate from a moral rule?  May an agent
perform an act that a secondary principle or corollary forbids if the
agent believes the act would be beneficial in this instance?  Mill’s an-
swer is unclear:
In the case of abstinences indeed—of things which people forbear
to do from moral considerations, though the consequences in the
particular case might be beneficial—it would be unworthy of an in-
telligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a
class, which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious, and
that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it.  The
amount of regard for the public interest implied in this recognition
is no greater than is demanded by every system of morals; for they
all enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to
society.36
Mill may hold that the agent should always follow a moral rule: per-
forming the forbidden act would violate “the obligation to abstain
from it.”37  Yet, he also recognizes that moral principles improve.  He
wrote, “The corollaries from the principle of utility, like the precepts
of every practical art, admit of indefinite improvement; and, in a pro-
gressive state of the human mind, their improvement is perpetually
going on.”38 Perhaps the most common way for a principle to im-
prove, or begin to improve, is for exceptions to be recognized.  Also,
Mill states that the reason for following a rule is that “the action is of a
class, which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious.”39  If
Mill would allow sub-classes within a class—after all, nearly every
class of act is a sub-class of a larger class—he would recognize excep-
tions because an act can be injurious in other sub-classes (even in all
other sub-classes), but not injurious in the sub-class at hand.  For ex-
ample, as a general rule, one should tell the truth, but not in the sub-
class of cases in which a lie would make happier all concerned agents
(and not merely the liar).  An exception is simply another, typically
more specific corollary, to the fundamental principle.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 35.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 43.
39. Id. at 35.
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In sum, the ultimate test of whether an act is right or wrong is the
consequences of the act.  We should not attempt to predict the conse-
quences of each act that we contemplate performing.  The facts are
too uncertain; the calculations are too complex and time consuming;
and our interests and biases are too likely to affect our predictions.  In
fact, we rarely attempt such predictions.  Instead, we follow moral
principles which we derive from experience.  Moral principles lead us
to the right action most of the time, but not always, and improvement
(as via exceptions) is ongoing.
Another way to express this conclusion is that the major premise
of a practical syllogism is not an a priori truth, but a principle that is




In the large majority of cases in which someone lied, the conse-
quences would have been better if the agent had told the truth.
INDUCTIVE INFERENCE




Following the principle of telling the truth usually leads to a good
outcome.
MINOR PREMISE
Nothing is unusual about the present situation.
CONCLUSION




In unusual cases in which someone lied, the consequences for all
concerned agents were better than if the agent had told the truth.
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INDUCTIVE INFERENCE
An exception to the principle of telling the truth arises in the un-
usual case in which a lie would make all concerned agents happier.
PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM
MAJOR PREMISE
An exception to the principle of telling the truth arises in the un-
usual case in which a lie would make all concerned agents happier.
MINOR PREMISE
The present situation is unusual because lying would make all
concerned agents happier than telling the truth would.
CONCLUSION
I should lie in this situation.
This analysis obliterates the lines between the three schools of
thought that I mentioned above.  Deontologists, as well as non-conse-
quentialists to the degree that they rely on arguments a priori, must
recognize that a principle is a summary of experience and, therefore,
principles derive from consequences.  Deontologists remain free to
base their moral decisions on principles; they may continue to follow
the rules and do their duty.  However, recognizing that principles can
change, deontologists must be prepared to create exceptions to princi-
ples or create new ones.  Consequentialists, as well as non-consequen-
tialists to the degree that they rely on arguments a posteriori, must
usually refrain from attempting to predict the consequences of each
act and basing a decision on that prediction.  Instead, they must (as
they are inclined to do) base nearly all of their moral decisions on
principles, but, knowing that principles can change, must be prepared
to recognize exceptions and new principles.  Properly understood, “re-
formed deontologist” and “reformed consequentialist” are two names
for the same moral agent.
II. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
A. A Principle of Judicial Restraint Grounded in Moral
Philosophy
How should an agent deal with arguments a priori and a posteri-
ori that conflict with one another? Before answering this question, I
need to state the distinction drawn by Kenneth Culp Davis between
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two types of fact: adjudicative and legislative.40  An adjudicative fact is
used to decide the dispute between the parties to the case at hand.41
An adjudicative fact, therefore, pertains only to these parties and is
either true or false (more precisely, proven or unproven).42
An adjudicative fact may have happened in the past or may be a
prediction of the future.43  For example, “A harassed and intimidated
B on six occasions in the past two months and, unless enjoined by this
court, is likely to continue doing so.”  Predictions of adjudicative facts
are permissible because they are limited to the parties to the case and
are grounded on the parties’ own behavior.44
In contrast, a legislative fact is used to create, amend, or rescind
rules or principles.45  A legislative fact, therefore, pertains to society
as a whole, or a significant part of it.  A legislative fact need not be
true of all persons in all circumstances, but is usually true.46  For ex-
ample, “smoking cigarettes causes cancer” is a legislative fact, though
many persons smoke for years and never develop cancer.  A legisla-
tive fact may have happened in the past or may be a prediction of the
future.47  For example, in the second half of the twentieth century,
children from disadvantaged environments scored lower on college
admission tests than did children from advantaged environments and,
without purposeful intervention, this discrepancy will continue in the
future.
Both findings of past legislative facts and predictions of future
legislative facts should be based on appropriate evidence, not on com-
mon knowledge or intuition.48  The appropriate evidence for a finding
of a legislative fact of the past might be historical accounts or the testi-
mony of experts.49  The appropriate evidence for a prediction of a leg-
islative fact might be a theory.50  In this event, the theory must be
identified, meet the criterion of acceptability in the discipline, and be
subject to rebuttal.  The evidence for a prediction might also be a se-
40. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Pro-
cess, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942).
41. Id.
42. Id.  Adjudicative facts operate at a low level of abstraction. See Michael Evan Gold,




46. Id.  Legislative facts operate at a high level of abstraction. Gold, supra note 42.“
47. Id.
48. Id. at 408–09.
49. Id. at 410.
50. Id.
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ries of decided cases in which the existing law leads to arguably unjust
results.  Prediction of this sort is fair because those cases are available
to all parties to comment upon.  A prediction may also be the result of
applying a theory to a specific situation.  Such a prediction should al-
ways be left to experts.  All legislative facts must be subject to the
adversarial process.  Each party should have the opportunity to refute
the other party’s evidence.
My comments about finding legislative facts apply to administra-
tive tribunals as well as to courts.  An administrative tribunal should
not find legislative facts based on the experience of its members.
Members of an administrative tribunal, although knowledgeable, are
not necessarily experts in any given theory.  They cannot be cross-
examined.  The theories and applications that may appear in their
opinions have not been exposed to contradiction by expert testimony.
In consequence, their knowledge helps them understand evidence in
the record, but their knowledge must not itself be evidence.  Moreo-
ver, the members of the tribunal are supposed to be neutral, but they
can hardly be neutral about theories, and applications of theories,
which they themselves introduce into a case.51
The boundary between adjudicative and legislative facts is not so
sharp as I have drawn it.  An adjudicative fact that occurs frequently
becomes a legislative fact; how else could a legislative fact be found?
Furthermore, a legislative fact may be useful in determining whether
an adjudicative fact is true in the present case; what usually happens
probably did happen in this case.  Nevertheless, a rule should not be
grounded on a small number of adjudicative facts—most certainly not
on the adjudicative facts of a single case—and the general truth of
legislative facts may help, but never suffice, to prove the adjudicative
facts in a given case.
Now I can answer the question stated at the outset of this essay:
how should an agent deal with an argument a priori, grounded on
principle that conflicts with an argument a posteriori, grounded on
consequences?  The argument a priori (most commonly, a precedent)
is presumptively stronger.  It is grounded on legislative facts of the
past which experience has confirmed to be true.52  If for no other rea-
son than that parties have conformed their behavior to principles, the
predictions intrinsic to principles have been confirmed.
51. Thus, I disagree with Supreme Court’s decision in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945). See generally id.
52. Davis, supra note 40.
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In some cases, however, the argument a posteriori is appealing.
An argument a posteriori may justify creating an exception to a rule if
the facts of the case at hand demonstrate that the exception would
produce better consequences for the concerned parties than the rule
would produce.  Being grounded on the adjudicative facts of the case
at hand, an exception does not require predictions, or makes predic-
tions about the parties based on their own behavior in the past.  Such
an exception may operate in subsequent cases if the adjudicative facts
of those cases, both facts of the past and predictions of the future, are
analogous to the adjudicative facts of the case at bar.  This reasoning
also applies to a case sui generis, the disposition of which should apply
only to the case at hand and to analogous subsequent cases.
When may a tribunal overturn an existing rule or standard,
amend, or create a new one, on the basis of arguments a posteriori?
The evidence must match the scope of the rule.53  It is obvious that the
adjudicative facts of a single case should not displace the experience
of many cases that support the existing rule; at most, an exception
may be justified in this circumstance.  But suppose new legislative
facts demonstrate that the existing rule has led to injustice in many
prior cases?  Such evidence is a posteriori in the sense that it is based
on consequences in prior cases, but the evidence is not grounded on
predictions; rather, the unjust consequences have occurred and are
facts to be proved in the case at hand.  In this circumstance, a tribunal
would have adequate reason to overturn an existing rule or standard
or create a new one.  These are the easy cases.
The harder cases involve challenges to a rule or standard based
on predictions of legislative facts.  Two aspects of such predictions are
relevant: the theory on which a prediction is based, and the applica-
tion of the theory to the facts at hand.  With regard to theory, whether
it be common sense or scientific, the theory must be presented as evi-
dence in the case.  Too often, an advocate or a judge understands only
part of a theory or misunderstands it altogether.  Thus, justice requires
that a theory be presented as evidence in order that it be open to the
adversarial process.  With regard to application of a theory, this task
must be left to experts.  Application by an advocate or a judge is far
too likely to demonstrate the truth of the old saying that a little
knowledge is dangerous.
53. See Gold, supra note 42, at 136–37.
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B. Application of the Principle
Let us apply the foregoing ideas to the Supreme Court’s opinions
in National Labor Relations Board v. Retail Store Employees Union,
Local 876 (Safeco).54  The Safeco Title Insurance Company insured
buyers and lenders against defects in the titles to real estate which the
buyers acquired.55  Customers desiring title insurance did not deal di-
rectly with Safeco or its agents; instead, customers dealt with indepen-
dent brokers, called “title companies,” which performed escrow and
other services as well as brokering title insurance.56  The title compa-
nies dealt almost exclusively with Safeco; over ninety percent of their
gross income derived from selling Safeco’s policies.57
Local 1001 of the Retail Store Employees Union represented
some of Safeco’s employees.58  When collective bargaining between
Safeco and the union reached an impasse, the union went on strike
and set up picket lines not only at Safeco’s offices, but also at the title
companies’ offices.59  For reasons that I will explain below, the picket
signs were carefully worded.  They did not urge customers of the title
companies to cease doing business with the companies.60  Instead, the
picket signs said that Safeco was a non-union firm and it did not have
a contract with Local 1001.61  The union also distributed handbills ask-
ing customers to cancel their Safeco policies.62  The handbills were
lawful and not an issue in the case.  The issue was the picketing.
Safeco and one of the title companies accused the union of engag-
ing in a secondary boycott.63  A secondary boycott occurs when a
union that has a labor dispute with an employer (the “primary em-
ployer”) directs economic force against another employer (the “sec-
ondary employer”) with the object of forcing the secondary employer
to cease doing business with the primary employer.64  Another term
for “secondary employer” is “neutral employer.”65  The latter term is
54. See generally NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 876 (Safeco) 447 U.S. 607
(1980) [hereinafter Safeco].





60. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 609.
61. Id. at 609–10.
62. Id. at 610.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 612–13.
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so plainly loaded—surely neutral firms deserve protection from dam-
age caused by other parties’ labor disputes—that I will refrain from
using that term, but I will reproduce it when a judge used it.  Perhaps
the most typical case involves a primary employer who sells goods or
services to the secondary employer.66  If the union can isolate the pri-
mary employer from its customers, the cost to the primary employer
of continuing the labor dispute increases.67  For example, suppose the
primary employer, P, makes fur hats.  The union has a dispute with P
and goes on strike. S, the secondary employer, is a retail store that
sells P’s fur hats.  When the strike against P is unsuccessful, the union
pickets S’s store. S, afraid of losing trade, stops selling P’s hats, and
the pickets disappear.  Having lost S as a customer, P feels increased
pressure to settle with the union.68
The National Labor Relations Act outlaws secondary boycotts,69
but suppose a union pickets, not a secondary employer’s business, but
a primary employer’s product which the secondary employer sells.
Consider the example in the preceding paragraph.  The union con-
cedes that it may not picket S’s store with the object of turning away
customers, but argues that it may picket the struck product, P’s fur
hats, thereby urging customers not purchase those hats while leaving
customers free to buy other items in S’s store.
The Supreme Court first ruled on product picketing in National
Labor Relations Board v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehouse-
men’s Union, Local 760 (Tree Fruits).70  Local 760 of the Fruit Packers
Union went on strike against employers that packed apples and sold
them to Safeway grocery stores under the brand “Washington State
Apples.”71  The employers continued to pack and ship apples in spite
of the strike, and so Local 760 also picketed the Safeway stores.72  The
picket signs were directed at the struck product, not at the stores: the
66. For example, in NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council (Gould &
Preisner), 341 U.S. 675 (1951), the secondary employer was a general contractor who purchased
services from a subcontractor who was the primary employer.  Similarly, in NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) [hereinafter Tree Fruits], discussed below, the
secondary employer, a grocery store, purchased apples from the primary employer, a fruit
packer.  In Safeco, 447 U.S. at 609, also discussed below, the secondary employer, an insurance
broker, purchased insurance policies from the primary employer, an insurance company.
67. ROBERT GORMAN & MATTHEW FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 313–14 (2d ed.
2004).
68. This example is drawn from Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
69. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 67, at chapter xii.
70. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 58.
71. Id. at 59–60.
72. Id. at 60.
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signs urged customers not to buy Washington State Apples, but did
not urge customers to shop at other grocery stores.73  The Court held
that the pickets were lawful.
In Safeco, the union’s basic argument was a priori: the precedent
of Tree Fruits controlled the case at bar.  The picket signs were lawful,
argued the union, because its signs, like those in Tree Fruits, targeted
the struck product, not the secondary employers.74  Safeco and the
title company advanced an argument a posteriori: because over ninety
percent of the title companies’ revenue came from Safeco’s policies,
the pickets could put the title companies out of business.75  The major-
ity of the Court, moved by the argument a posteriori, outlawed the
picketing; the dissent, moved by the argument a priori, would have
allowed the picketing.76  Let us examine those two opinions, attending
to the nature of the rules and the arguments, not to labor policy.
But first, a word about the relevant statute is necessary.  The rele-
vant section of the National Labor Relations Act reads:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents
. . .
(4)(i) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is:
. . .
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . selling . . . the
products of any other producer . . . or to cease doing business with
any other person. . . .77
Two comments on the construction of this section are in order.  First,
the words “threaten, coerce, or restrain” suggest rather violent action.
However, as Tree Fruits and Safeco demonstrate, these words have
been interpreted to encompass peaceful picketing.78  Second, the
words “an object thereof” indicate a subjective standard in which the
union’s intent is crucial.  However, the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts have made the standard objective by applying
the doctrine that one intends what is reasonably foreseeable: “the
Union’s secondary appeal against the central product sold by the title
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 607.
76. Id. at 615–16.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B).
78. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616.
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companies in this case is ‘reasonably calculated to induce customers
not to patronize the neutral parties at all.’ . . . . Product picketing that
reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or
substantial loss simply does not square with the language or the pur-
pose of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).”79
It will be convenient to begin with the dissent, which Justice
Brennan wrote.  He argued that the precedent of Tree Fruits should
be honored.80  Accordingly, I will first examine Tree Fruits, and then I
will turn to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Safeco.
The reader will recall that the union in Tree Fruits had a dispute
with the packers of Washington State Apples and picketed Safeway
stores with signs that urged customers to boycott the apples, but not
the stores.81  In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court held that the
picketing was lawful:
We come then to the question whether the picketing in this case,
confined as it was to persuading customers to cease buying the
product of the primary employer, falls within the area of secondary
consumer picketing which Congress [intended] to prohibit under § 8
(b)(4)(ii). We hold that it did not fall within that area, and therefore
did not “threaten, coerce, or restrain” Safeway.82
Thus, the standard in Tree Fruits was that a union could picket a sec-
ondary employer as long as the picketing was aimed only at the struck
product.83  This was an a priori standard because it focused on the
intent of the picketing, not on its effects.
As the standard in Tree Fruits was a priori, so were the reasons
for the standard.  (It would be interesting to inquire whether a priori
reasons and a priori rules tend to be associated, and likewise for a
posteriori reasons and rules.)  Justice Brennan examined the legisla-
tive history at length and concluded:
It does not reflect with the requisite clarity a congressional plan to
proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, and,
particularly, any concern with peaceful picketing when it is limited,
as here, to persuading Safeway customers not to buy Washington
State apples when they traded in the Safeway stores.  All that the
legislative history shows in the way of an “isolated evil” believed to
require proscription of peaceful consumer picketing at secondary
79. Id. at 614–15 (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 620 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 60.
82. Id. at 71.
83. Id.
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sites, was its use to persuade the customers of the secondary em-
ployer to cease trading with him in order to force him to cease deal-
ing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer.  This
narrow focus reflects the difference between such conduct and
peaceful picketing at the secondary site directed only at the struck
product.  In the latter case, the union’s appeal to the public is con-
fined to its dispute with the primary employer, since the public is
not asked to withhold its patronage from the secondary employer,
but only to boycott the primary employer’s goods.  On the other
hand, a union appeal to the public at the secondary site not to trade
at all with the secondary employer goes beyond the goods of the
primary employer and seeks the public’s assistance in forcing the
secondary employer to cooperate with the union in its primary dis-
pute.  This is not to say that this distinction was expressly alluded to
in the debates.  It is to say, however, that the consumer picketing
carried on in this case is not attended by the abuses at which the
statute was directed.84
The purpose of a statute (the “abuses” at which it is aimed) and
its legislative history are a priori reasons because they occur before
the statute is passed and before the acts of the parties to the case.
As Justice Brennan wrote the Court’s opinion in Tree Fruits and
the dissent in Safeco, we should not be surprised that both the rule
and the reasons for it were a priori in the latter opinion as well.  Jus-
tice Brennan wrote in Safeco:
[T]he pivotal question in secondary site picketing is determining
when the pressure imposed by consumer picketing is illegitimate,
and therefore deemed to “coerce” the secondary employer. Tree
Fruits addressed this problem by focusing upon whether picketing at
the secondary site is directed at the primary employer’s product, or
whether it more broadly exhorts customers to withhold patronage
from the full range of goods carried by the secondary retailer, in-
cluding those goods originating from nonprimary sources.  The Tree
Fruits test reflects the distinction between economic damage sus-
tained by the secondary firm solely by virtue of its dependence upon
the primary employer’s goods, and injuries inflicted upon interests
of the secondary firm that are unrelated to the primary dis-
pute. . . .85 Tree Fruits expressly rejected the notion that the coer-
civeness of picketing should depend upon the extent of loss suffered
84. Id. at 63–64.
85. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 620 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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by the secondary firm through diminished purchases of the primary
product.86
Justice Brennan relied on precedent, a species of a priori argu-
ment, and the rule he advocated turned on the intent of the picketing,
an a priori standard.87  The legislative facts undergirding Justice Bren-
nan’s opinion were facts in the record of Tree Fruits, not predictions.
Nonetheless, he did not pay sufficient attention to more recent experi-
ence, as I will show after discussing the opinion of the majority of the
Court.
Justice Powell’s opinion for the majority held that the legality of
product picketing depends on its effect on the secondary employer.88
This holding operated a posteriori because the effects occurred after
the picketing occurred.  Justice Powell stated the rule thus: “Since suc-
cessful secondary picketing would put the title companies to a choice
between their survival and the severance of ties with Safeco, the pick-
eting plainly violates the statutory ban on the coercion of neutrals
. . . .”89  That liability under this rule depends on the consequences of
the picketing is clear from the following passage:
The picketing in Tree Fruits and the picketing in this case are rela-
tively extreme examples of the spectrum of conduct that the Board
and the courts will encounter in complaints charging violations of
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).  If secondary picketing were directed against a
product representing a major portion of a neutral’s business, but
significantly less than that represented by a single dominant prod-
uct, neither Tree Fruits nor today’s decision necessarily would con-
trol.  The critical question would be whether, by encouraging
customers to reject the struck product, the secondary appeal is rea-
sonably likely to threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial
loss.  Resolution in each case will be entrusted to the Board’s
expertise.90
As the rule of Safeco was a posteriori, so also were the reasons for
the rule.  Although Justice Powell referred to the text, purpose, and
legislative history of the statute, the most influential reason, I believe,
was the effect of product picketing on the title companies.  He wrote:
“Although Tree Fruits suggested that secondary picketing against a
struck product and secondary picketing against a neutral party were
86. Id. at 622.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 615 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 616, n.11.
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‘poles apart,’ the courts soon discovered that product picketing could
have the same effect as an illegal secondary boycott.”91  He continued:
The product picketed in Tree Fruits was but one item among the
many that made up the retailer’s trade. . . . In [Safeco,] on the other
hand, the title companies sell only the primary employer’s product
and perform the services associated with it.  Secondary picketing
against consumption of the primary product leaves responsive con-
sumers no realistic option other than to boycott the title companies
altogether. . . .As long as secondary picketing only discourages con-
sumption of a struck product, incidental injury to a neutral is a natu-
ral consequence of an effective primary boycott.  But the Union’s
secondary appeal against the central product sold by the title com-
panies in this case is “reasonably calculated to induce customers not
to patronize the neutral parties at all.  226 N.L.R.B., at 757.  The
resulting injury to their businesses is distinctly different from the
injury that the Court considered in Tree Fruits. . . . [S]uccessful sec-
ondary picketing would put the title companies to a choice between
their survival and the severance of their ties with Safeco . . . (cita-
tion omitted). We do not disagree with Mr. Justice Brennan’s dis-
senting view that successful secondary product picketing may have
no greater effect upon a neutral than a legal primary boycott.  But
when the neutral’s business depends upon the products of a particu-
lar primary employer, secondary product picketing can produce in-
jury almost identical to the harm resulting from an illegal secondary
boycott.  Congress intended § 8 (b)(4)(ii)(B) to protect neutrals
from that type of coercion.  Mr. Justice Brennan’s view that the le-
gality of secondary picketing should depend upon whether the pick-
ets “urge only a boycott of the primary employer’s product” would
provide little or no protection.92
A posteriori arguments usually incorporate predictions of the fu-
ture, and three predictions were embedded in the foregoing passage.
Only the first of them was justified.
Justice Powell’s first prediction was that secondary picketing
against consumption of the primary product leaves responsive con-
sumers no realistic option other than to boycott the title companies
altogether.93  This prediction is not supported by evidence in the re-
cord but is obviously correct.  Given that the title companies sold only
91. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 612 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 613–16, n.8 (citations and other footnotes omitted).
93. Id. at 611.
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Safeco policies, boycotting Safeco policies could only mean boycotting
the title companies.94
Justice Powell’s second prediction lay in this sentence:
“[S]uccessful secondary picketing would put the title companies to a
choice between their survival and the severance of their ties with
Safeco . . . .”95  This prediction is not supported by any evidence in the
record, and the prediction is not obviously correct.  Indeed, it seems
false.  Even if the picketing turned away all potential buyers of
Safeco’s insurance policies, the title companies would not have
needed to sever their ties to Safeco.  The companies could simply have
added to their inventory other insurance companies’ policies, just as
they would have done if they had lost trade because other insurance
companies offered customers better policies at lower prices or offered
the title companies higher commissions.  But this is my prediction, and
it is as unimportant as Justice Powell’s was unless supported by evi-
dence in the record.
Justice Powell’s third prediction was implicit throughout his opin-
ion: he implied that the picketing would be successful and that it might
reduce the title companies’ revenue by as much as ninety percent.96
To have been this successful, the picketing would have had to per-
suade every customer to patronize other title companies that sold
other insurance policies.  The likelihood of such perfection ap-
proaches zero.  Indeed, as between the extremes—all customers
honored the picket line, no customers honored the picket line—the
latter was more likely.  Once again, however, these are my predic-
tions, which are no better and no worse than Justice Powell’s.  Evi-
dence was needed, not intuition.  Yet the reports of the case contain
no evidence that the picketing caused the title companies to lose any
revenue.
Evidently recognizing that a precedent should not be overruled
on the basis of a single case, Justice Powell invoked a line of cases in
which the primary employer’s product merged into the secondary em-
ployer’s product so that a consumer could not boycott only the pri-
mary’s product (“merged-product” cases).97  For example, in
American Bread,98 which Justice Powell cited in a footnote, Local 327
94. Id. at 610.
95. Id. at 615.
96. Id. at 609–10.
97. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 613, n.7.
98. American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1969).
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of the Teamsters had a labor dispute with a company that made bread
under the label “Sunbeam” and sold it to restaurants.99  The union
engaged in product picketing at the restaurants; the picket signs read,
“Attn: Customers.  Sunbeam bread sold here.  Local 327.”100  But
Sunbeam bread had lost its identity in the restaurants; a customer
could not identify and avoid it, for it was merged into the meals the
restaurant served.101  Therefore, as a practical matter, the picket signs
called for a boycott of the restaurants.  In Cement Masons,102 which
Justice Powell discussed in the text of his opinion, Whitney, a general
contractor (the primary employer), built houses in a subdivision
owned by Shuler (the secondary employer), who sold the houses to
customers.103  A dispute arose between Whitney and the union be-
cause Whitney paid non-union masons less than union scale, and the
union picketed the only entrance to the subdivision.104  The picket
signs mentioned the dispute between Whitney and the union, then ad-
ded, “PLEASE DO NOT PURCHASE THESE HOMES.”105  The picketing
was illegal because it asked customers to boycott Shuler.  (I believe
the outcome of Cement Masons would have been the same if the
picket signs had read, “PLEASE DON’T PURCHASE HOMES BUILT BY
WHITNEY” or “PLEASE DON’T PURCHASE HOMES BUILT BY UNDERPAID
MASONS” because Whitney’s underpaid masons had worked on all of
the houses in the subdivision.)  Justice Powell quoted from the opinion
of the Court of Appeals: “‘[W]hen a union’s interest in picketing a
primary employer at a “[merged-] product” site [directly conflicts]
with the need to protect . . . neutral employers from the labor disputes
of others,’ Congress has determined that the neutrals’ interests should
prevail.”106
My goal is not to criticize the cases I have just discussed on the
ground of labor policy; therefore, I will accept arguendo that the pick-
eting in American Bread and Cement Masons violated the statute.  My
goal is to consider whether these cases provided the Court with suffi-
cient reasons a posteriori to overrule the precedent of Tree Fruits.  I
have argued above that the evidence in support of a new rule (or any
99. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 610, nn.2–3.
100. American Bread Co., 411 F.2d at 150.
101. Id.
102. Hoffman ex rel. NLRB v. Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973).
103. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 612–13.
104. Hoffman, 468 F.2d at 1190.
105. Id.
106. Safeco, 447 U.S at 612–613 (quoting Hoffman, 468 F.2d at 1191) (citation omitted).
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rule, for that matter) should match its scope.  To overturn an existing
rule, the new legislative facts must show that the rule has led to injus-
tice in many prior cases.  But the evidence for the new rule in Safeco
was a narrow line of cases in which the secondary employers offered
products from which the struck product could not be isolated.107  Sun-
beam’s bread could not be separated from the restaurants’ meals.
Whitney’s underpaid masonry could not be separated from Shuler’s
houses.  Safeco’s insurance policies could not be separated from the
title companies’ services.  As a result, the experience captured in the
cases on which Justice Powell relied, justified creating an exception to
the rule of Tree Fruits, but did not justify abandoning that rule.  By
overruling Tree Fruits, Justice Powell implicitly predicted that the new
rule promulgated in Safeco, which yielded better results in merged-
product cases than the rule of Tree Fruits would have yielded, would
also yield better results in all other product-picketing cases; but he
had no basis in the record for this prediction—no theory, no expert
testimony, no experience extracted from prior cases.108  He had only
his intuition, which was not open to the adversarial process.
One might reply to my arguments that Justice Powell simply de-
ferred to the expertise of the Labor Board.109  The argument is that
the members of this administrative tribunal are chosen for their
knowledge of labor relations, and they are entitled to find legislative
facts based on their experience.  Thus, continues the reply, it was the
Board, not Justice Powell, that predicted the legislative facts on which
Safeco overruled Tree Fruits.  But this reply is mistaken.  Neither ex-
plicitly nor implicitly did the Board find the legislative facts or make
the predictions that Justice Powell did.
In contrast to both the majority of the Supreme Court and the
dissent, the Labor Board took a correct approach to Safeco.110  Con-
tinuing to assume that the picketing put unfair pressure on the title
companies, I believe that Justice Brennan’s dissent unjustly ignored
this harm: following Tree Fruits would have allowed the picketing to
continue.  As well, the majority unjustifiably overruled Tree Fruits; the
record did not contain evidence of the legislative facts necessary to
take this step.  Only the Labor Board found a solution that was both
just and justifiable.
107. Id.
108. See generally Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 58; Safeco, 447 U.S. at 607.
109. Id. at 615, n.11.
110. Id. at 616.
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The Board followed its precedent in Dow Chemical.111 A union
had a dispute with an oil refinery and picketed the gasoline stations
that sold the refinery’s product.112  Although the picket signs asked
consumers to boycott the gasoline, not the stations, the Board ruled
that the picketing was a secondary boycott.113 Dow Chemical was a
merged-product case: the oil refinery’s product was merged into the
business of the service stations. Safeco was analogous to Dow Chemi-
cal, American Bread, and Cement Masons because Safeco’s insurance
policies were merged into the business of the title companies, and so
the picketing put unfair pressure on the companies.114  By prohibiting
the picketing, the Board relieved the companies of this pressure.  In
addition, advocates before the Board in Safeco had ample opportunity
to criticize the line of merged-product cases and to offer new evi-
dence.115  The Board chose to rely on the experience reflected in those
cases to maintain the merged-product exception to Tree Fruits.116  The
Board had before it no evidence of the application of the Tree Fruits
doctrine to product picketing in cases not involving a merged product,
and, quite properly, the Board did not question that doctrine.
Based on evidence, not on speculative prediction, the Board cre-
ated a warranted exception to a precedent and did justice in the case
at hand.  Justices Powell and Brennan should have done the same.
111. See Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chemical Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 649
(1974), enf. denied, 173 U.S. App. D.C. 299, 524 F.2d 853 (1975).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 651.
114. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 610.
115. Id. at 616, n.7.
116. Id. at 613, 615.
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